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Abstract
This paper shows that the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Rényi maximal correlation between the message and the ciphertext provides
good secrecy guarantees for cryptosystems that use short keys. We first establish a bound on the eavesdropper’s advantage in
guessing functions of the message in terms of maximal correlation and the Rényi entropy of the message. This result implies
that maximal correlation is stronger than the notion of entropic security introduced by Russell and Wang. We then show that
a small maximal correlation ρ can be achieved via a randomly generated cipher with key length ≈ 2 log(1/ρ), independent of
the message length, and by a stream cipher with key length 2 log(1/ρ) + logn + 2 for a message of length n. We establish a
converse showing that these ciphers are close to optimal. This is in contrast to entropic security for which there is a gap between
the lower and upper bounds. Finally, we show that a small maximal correlation implies secrecy with respect to several mutual
information based criteria but is not necessarily implied by them. Hence, maximal correlation is a stronger and more practically
relevant measure of secrecy than mutual information.
Index Terms
Information-theoretic secrecy, Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Rényi maximal correlation, entropic security, stream cipher, expander graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the symmetric-key cryptosystem setting in which Alice encrypts a message (plaintext) M of length n bits using a
shared secret key K of length s bits into a ciphertext C and sends it to Bob who recovers the message using the ciphertext
and the key. The system is said to provide perfect secrecy if the eavesdropper Eve cannot gain any information about the
message from the ciphertext C alone, that is, if M and C are independent. Shannon [1] showed that achieving perfect secrecy
requires the key to be as long as the message. This result is considered impractical for most cryptographic applications and
much shorter keys than the message are commonly used.
To analyze the secrecy of cryptosystems that use short keys, less stringent criteria than perfect secrecy have been proposed.
One such criterion is to limit Eve’s ability to guess functions of M , by requiring that the difference between Eve’s probability
of correctly guessing a function f(M) of the message by a function of the ciphertext f˜(C) and the maximum probability of
correctly guessing f(M) without knowledge of C, referred to as the advantage of Eve
Adv(f, f˜) = P
{
f(M) = f˜(C)
}
−max
i
P {f(M) = i} (1)
to be small. While perfect secrecy is equivalent to requiring the advantage to be less than or equal to zero for all functions of
M , we show that requiring the advantage to be less than a small positive value for all functions can be satisfied by keys that
are much shorter than the message. In semantic security [2], a small advantage is required with the additional restriction that
Eve uses only probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. Although satisfied by short keys, proofs of semantic security rely on
unproven computational hardness assumptions. The closest work to this paper is entropic security introduced by Russell and
Wang [3] and studied by Dodis and Smith [4], which requires a small advantage assuming the min-entropy of M is large.
They proposed several ciphers with short keys that achieve entropic security and established lower bounds on the key length
needed to achieve entropic security. Their lower bounds and achievability results do not match, however (refer to Remark 2
in Section IV for details).
In this paper, we show that the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Rényi maximal correlation [5], [6], [7] between the message and the
ciphertext, defined as
ρm(M ;C) = max
f(m),g(c):E(f(M))=E(g(C))=0,
E(f2(M))=E(g2(C))=1
E
(
f(M)g(C)
)
, (2)
is a natural measure of secrecy for ciphers with short keys. We say that a cipher achieves ρ-maximal correlation secrecy if
ρm(M ; C) ≤ ρ when M is uniformly distributed.
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2Ciphers achieving maximal correlation secrecy can guarantee a small advantage. If M is uniformly distributed and f is a
one-bit function, e.g., one of the bits of the message, then the relationship between maximal correlation and the advantage
follows readily by the work of Witsenhausen [8]. Applying the result by Calmon et al. [9], the advantage for uniformly
distributed M and general f is upper-bounded by ρ. A contribution of this paper is to extend this result on the relationship
between maximal correlation and the advantage to scenarios in which the distribution of M is not fixed and Eve has access
to some side information about the message.
Maximal correlation has numerous applications in information theory and statistics; see [10] for an overview. The work
of Zhao and Chia [11] relates maximal correlation and secret key generation. The role of maximal correlation and principal
inertia components in security and privacy was investigated by Calmon et al. [9], [12], [13].
Several other information theoretic secrecy criteria that do not require long keys have also been proposed. In [14], Wyner
proposed the wiretap channel where Eve observes a noisy version of the ciphertext. In [15], Ozarow and Wyner studied the
wiretap channel setting in which Eve can choose a subset of the ciphertext bits to observe. In such settings, secrecy criteria based
on the mutual information between the message and the eavesdropper’s observation (e.g., weak secrecy and strong secrecy [16],
[17], [18]) are typically used. Semantic security has also been applied to wiretap channels [19] without limitations on Eve’s
computational power. In [20], Massey and Ingemarsson proposed a cipher with a long transmission delay which is secure
assuming a memory constraint on Eve. In [21], Cachin and Maurer proposed a cipher assuming a memory constraint on Eve,
but without long delay. In [22], Maurer considered the scenario where Alice, Bob and Eve observe a random source over
different noisy channels. In [23], Maurer studied the case where there is a large public random source, and the number of
bits in the random source that Eve can examine is limited. In [24], [25], Calmon et al. proposed a secrecy criterion called
-symbol secrecy which limits Eve’s knowledge on subsets of bits of the message. Note that the security criteria in the above
works either depend on the bit structure of the message or ciphertext (e.g., noise is applied to the bits in wiretap channel, and
-symbol secrecy aims at protecting bits of the message), or impose a memory constraint. In contrast, ρ-maximal correlation
secrecy (like entropic security) does not depend on the bit structure of the message, guaranteeing that the cipher hides every
function of the messages (not only bits) equally well from an eavesdropper with unlimited memory and computational power.
The main contributions of this paper, which is an extended and more complete version of [26], are as follows (also see
Figure 1).
Rényi entropy constrained security. In Section III, we define the notion of Rényi entropy constrained security and show that a
ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher also achieves a variant of semantic security with computationally unbounded adversary. In
Theorem 1, we show that for non-uniform M , the advantage is upper-bounded by 2(n−H2(M))/2ρ, where H2(M) is the Rényi
entropy of M . Therefore we are able to provide secrecy guarantees for a cipher used on data with different pmfs, and even
if some partial information about M is provided to Eve. We further show that a small maximal correlation secrecy implies
entropic security (refer to Remark 1 in Section III for details). The proof of our result is given in Section VI-B.
Maximal correlation secrecy key length. In Section IV, we show the surprising result that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy can
be achieved by short keys of length independent of the message length. We first establish a converse result showing that
every ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher must have a key length s ≥ 2 log(1/ρ) − log (1 + 2−nρ−2) bits (Theorem 2).
We then show that a cipher constructed using expander graphs can achieve ρ-maximal correlation secrecy with a key length
s = (2 +O(1/ log n)) log(1/ρ) +O(1) as n → ∞ (Theorem 4). We further show that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy can be
achieved with high probability via a randomly generated binary additive stream cipher with a key length s = 2 log(1/ρ) +
log n+2 (Theorem 5). These results show that the tradeoff s ≈ 2 log(1/ρ) is optimal for large n. In contrast, the lower bounds
on the key length for entropic security is not close to the achievable key length (refer to Remark 2 in Section IV for details).
The proofs of these results are given in Section VI. For example, for a 1GB message and a 512-bits key, an advantage can be
bounded by ≈ 10−70.
Relationship to other secrecy criteria. In Section V we show that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy is a stronger measure of secrecy
than the notions of strong secrecy [16], [18], weak secrecy [14], and leakage rate [27], which use the mutual information between
the message and the ciphertext. We show that these measures are implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy with suitable choices
of ρ, but do not imply ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for any ρ < 1.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
Throughout this paper, we denote the joint probability matrix of X and Y by PX,Y ∈ R|X |×|Y|. We denote the spectral
norm of the matrix A ∈ Rm×n as
‖A‖ = max
v∈Rn, ‖v‖=1
‖Av‖
and its Frobenius norm as ‖A‖F . We denote the m × n matrix consisting of all ones by 1m×n. The log function is base 2
and the entropy is measured in bits. We use the notation [1 : n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and Unif(A) to be the uniform probability
mass function (pmf) over a finite set A.
3Adv
ρ
Key length s
s =
(
2 log 1ρ
)(
1 +O( 1logn )
)
+O(1) (Theorem 4)
s ≥ log
(
1
ρ2+2−n
)
(Theorem 2)
Adv ≤ 2n−H2(M)2 ρ (Theorem 1)
s ≈ n−H2(M) + 2 log 1Adv
Figure 1. Summary of the relationship between Adv, s and ρ, given in Theorem 1, 2 and 4.
We consider a cryptosystem that consists of
• a message M ∈M, where M = [1 : 2n], i.e., M is an n-bit message, unless specified otherwise,
• a random secret key K ∼ Unif(K), where K = [1 : 2s] unless specified otherwise,
• an encryption function E(k,m) that maps every pair (k,m) ∈ K×M into a ciphertext c ∈ C, where C = [1 : 2n] unless
specified otherwise, and
• a decryption function D(k, c) that maps every pair (k, c) ∈ K×C into a message m ∈M such that D(k,E(k,m)) = m
for any m, k.
The pair of encryption and decryption functions (E,D) is called a (block) cipher. We assume throughout the paper that the
eavesdropper knows the ciphertext C but not the message M or the key K. A cipher is said to be ρ-maximal correlation secure
if ρm(M,E(K,M)) ≤ ρ assuming that M ∼ Unif(M), where ρm is as defined in (2). The encryption function can also be
probabilistic. In this case, the ciphertext C = E(K,M,W ) is also a function of a random variable W , which is generated
using the local randomness at the sender, and is unknown to the receiver and the eavesdropper. The cipher is assumed to be
deterministic unless specified otherwise.
III. RÉNYI ENTROPY CONSTRAINED SECURITY
In this section we show that every ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher satisfies a variant of semantic security. Recall that
a cipher is said to be semantically secure [28] if for any pmf p(m) on M , any function f(m), and any partial information
function h(m) of the message, if M is generated according to p(m), the eavesdropper who observes the ciphertext C and
h(M) (and also knows the choices of n, p, f and h) cannot correctly guess f(M) using a probabilistic, polynomial-time
algorithm with probability non-negligibly higher than the best probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm for guessing f(M)
using only h(M) (and also the choices of n, p, f and h). In other words, the eavesdropper cannot improve the probability of
guessing f(M) correctly by observing C. Note that the definition in [28] allows p(m) to be a pmf on messages with different
lengths. For simplicity, we consider p(m) to be a pmf on messages with the same length n.
We assume p(m) is a pmf on message with the same length n, and leave out the computational complexity assumptions on
p, f and h here since they are not the main concern of this paper.
Rényi entropy constrained security is a variant of semantic security in which we remove the limitation on computational
power but restrict the choice of the pmf p(m) to have a large Rényi entropy H2(M) (or equivalently a small χ2-divergence [29]
from the uniform pmf), that is,
H2(M) = − log
∑
m
(p(m))
2 ≥ t
for some t ≥ 0. It is formally defined below.
Definition 1. A cipher is said to be (t, )-Rényi entropy constrained secure if for any pmf p(m) with H2(M) ≥ t, any function
f(m) of the message, and any eavesdropper’s guess f˜(c) of f(m), when the message M is generated according to p(m), the
advantage as defined in (1) is bounded as Adv(f, f˜) ≤ .
The case of partial information h(m) will be addressed later.
We now show that maximal correlation secrecy implies Rényi entropy constrained security.
Theorem 1. A ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher is (t, )-Rényi entropy constrained secure for any t ≥ 0 and
 = 2(n−t)/2ρ.
Moreover, if the choice of f(m) is restricted to one-bit functions f(m) ∈ {0, 1}, then the advantage is bounded by
 = 2(n−t)/2−1ρ.
4The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI-B. Note that ρ is always measured assuming the pmf of the message is
uniform, though the theorem shows that ρ can also be used to bound the advantage when p(m) is non-uniform. Also note that
the value of n − t corresponds to the deviation of p(m) from the uniform distribution, and can be very small when p(m) is
close to uniform.
The Rényi entropy constrained security can be extended to scenarios in which partial information h(m) is available to Eve.
We restrict the choices of p(m) and h(m) to satisfy the condition∑
a
P {h(M) = a} 2−H2(M |h(M)=a)/2 ≤ 2−τ/2,
where τ ≥ 0 is a constant and H2(M |h(M) = a) is the Rényi entropy of the conditional pmf of M given h(M) = a. The
eavesdropper’s guess f˜(c, h(m)) can depend on h(M), and the advantage is now defined as
P{f(M) = f˜(C, h(M))} − E
(
max
i
P{f(M) = i | h(M)}
)
.
where the second term is the probability of guessing f(M) correctly using the maximum a posteriori estimation of f(M)
given h(M). As a consequence of Theorem 1, for a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher, the advantage is upper bounded by
2(n−τ)/2ρ.
The value of ρ directly corresponds to the eavesdropper advantage and the correct probability of the eavesdropper’s guess.
For example, if the message M is uniformly distributed, (i.e., t = n), then the eavesdropper cannot correctly guess any one-bit
function such that P{f(M) = 1} = 1/2 with probability larger than (1 + ρ) /2. As another example, if M is uniformly
distributed and l bits of M (at fixed positions) are provided to the eavesdropper via the partial information h(m), then the
advantage of the eavesdropper is upper bounded by 2l/2ρ.
To illustrate our results, suppose we wish to protect a message of length n = 8 × 109 (i.e., 1GB) with a key of length
s = 512. By Theorem 5, we can achieve ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for ρ = 1.54× 10−72 using a binary additive stream
cipher. As a result, if M is uniformly distributed, then the advantage of the eavesdropper is upper bounded by 1.54× 10−72.
If l = 100 bits of M are provided to the eavesdropper, then the advantage is bounded by 1.74 × 10−57. We can see that a
cipher with key length much shorter than the message length can provide good security guarantees.
Remark 1. We can show that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy implies (t, )-entropic security (as defined in [4]) for  = 2(n−t)/2ρ.
In fact the implication holds even when the min-entropy H∞(M) in entropic security is replaced by Rényi entropy H2(M),
i.e., for any pmf p(m) of M with H2(M) ≥ t, and any function f˜(c), there exists a random variable F˜ independent of M
such that for any function f(m), ∣∣∣P{f(M) = f˜(C)} − P{f(M) = F˜}∣∣∣ ≤ .
Since H2(M) ≥ H∞(M) and the difference can be quite large if one of the messages has a high probability, maximal
correlation secrecy can be much stronger than entropic security. The proof is given in Section VI-B.
IV. MAXIMAL CORRELATION SECRECY KEY LENGTH
We provide bounds on the key length of a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher in terms of ρ and the message length n. We
first establish the following lower bound on the key length.
Theorem 2. If a cipher is ρ-maximal correlation secure, then its key length is lower bounded as
s ≥ log
(
1
ρ2 + 2−n
)
.
The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI-C. Note that when ρ > 0, this lower bound can be written as
s ≥ 2 log 1
ρ
− log
(
1 +
1
2nρ2
)
,
which approaches 2 log(1/ρ) as n tends to infinity. Also note that this bound applies to any ciphertext length (not necessarily
equal to message length) and to probabilistic encryption functions.
We now consider a construction of a cipher with key length close to the lower bound using expander graphs similar to [4],
[30]. Let G be a d-regular graph with vertices [1 : 2n] and edges (m, E(k,m)) for m ∈ [1 : 2n], k ∈ [1 : d], where E is
a labeling of the edges of G. The graph may be a multigraph with multiple instances of the same edge, and we assume the
graph is undirected, i.e., the number of edges (m, c) is the same as the number of edges (c,m). Further assume the labeling
is invertible, i.e., there exists function D(k, c) such that D(k,E(k,m)) = m for all m, k. The adjacency matrix of G is given
by
A ∈ R2n×2n , Am,c = |{k : E(k,m) = c}| .
5Such a graph is referred to as an expander graph if the magnitude of the second largest eigenvalue (in absolute value) of A
|λ2(A)| =
∥∥∥∥A− d2n12n×2n
∥∥∥∥
is small. An expander graph can be constructed explicitly. For example, a (non-bipartite) Ramanujan graph [31] has a second
eigenvalue
|λ2(A)| ≤ 2
√
d− 1.
Given an expander graph, we can define a corresponding expander graph cipher with M = C = [1 : 2n], K = [1 : d],
encryption function E(k,m), and decryption function D(k, c). We now find the maximal correlation for such an expander
graph cipher.
Theorem 3. The cipher defined by an expander graph with adjacency matrix A has maximal correlation
ρm(M ;C) =
1
d
|λ2(A)|.
As a result, the cipher corresponding to a non-bipartite Ramanujan graph is ρ-maximal correlation secure if
log d ≥ 2 log 1
ρ
+ 2.
where s = log d corresponds to the key length if it is an integer.
The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI-D. It is a consequence of the characterization of maximal correlation in [8].
The relationship between maximal correlation and the second eigenvalue of a graph is also studied in [32]. A limitation of
this construction is that there may not be constructions of Ramanujan graphs for a desired n and s. Using the result in [33] on
the second eigenvalue of random regular graphs, we can show the existence of maximal correlation secure ciphers with key
lengths close to the lower bound for any large enough n and s.
Theorem 4. There exists a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher with message length n ≥ 2 and key length s ≥ 2 if
s ≥
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
α
log n
)
+ α,
where α > 0 is a constant.
The following corollary provides a bound on s which is independent of n.
Corollary 1. There exists a ρ-maximal correlation secure cipher with message length n ≥ 2 and key length s ≥ 2 if
s ≥
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
3α/2
log(log(1/ρ) + 1)
)
,
where α > 0 is a constant.
The proofs of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 are in Section VI-E. This corollary shows that for any ρ, a key length which
depends only on ρ is sufficient to achieve ρ-maximal correlation secrecy for any message length. This is in a strong contrast
to perfect secrecy, which requires the key length to be at least the message length.
Maximal correlation secrecy can also be achieved by a simpler cipher with a sightly longer key length. Consider a
binary additive stream cipher M = C = {0, 1}n, K = {0, 1}s, E(k,m) = m ⊕ g(k), D(k, c) = c ⊕ g(k), where
g(k) = (g1(k), g2(k), . . . , gn(k)) ∈ {0, 1}n is the keystream generator and ⊕ is component-wise mod2 addition. The following
theorem shows that most binary additive stream ciphers with slightly longer key than the lower bound in Theorem 2 are ρ-
maximal correlation secure.
Theorem 5. Let Gi(k), i ∈ [1 : n], k ∈ [1 : 2s] be i.i.d. Bern(1/2) random keystream components. Let ρ > 0,  > 0, then
P{ρm(M ; M ⊕G(K)) ≤ ρ} > 1− ,
where the randomness of ρm(M ;M ⊕G(K)) is induced by the random keystream generator, if the key length
s ≥ 2 log 1
ρ
+ log n+ log
(
1 +
1
n
log
1

)
+ 2.
The proof of this theorem is given in Section VI-F. Substituting  = 1 in the theorem shows that there exists a binary
additive stream cipher that is ρ-maximal correlation secure with a key length
s ≥ 2 log 1
ρ
+ log n+ 2.
6Hence for a constant ρ > 0, a key size of around log n is sufficient.
Figure IV plots the lower bound on the key length in Theorem 2, the key length achievable by the expander graph cipher
using the Ramanujan graphs in Theorem 3, and the key length achievable by the random stream cipher in Theorem 5 versus
ρ for n = 10000.
Figure 2. Comparison of the lower bound and the achievable key lengths for n = 10000.
Remark 2. By the achievability result in Theorem 3 where s = 2 log(1/ρ) + 2, there exist ciphers which achieve (t, )-Rényi
entropy constrained security with key length
s = n− t+ 2 log 1

+ 2.
This is the same key length required by entropic security in [4] (Corollary 3.3). Since (t, )-Rényi entropy constrained security
implies (t, )-entropic security, it is possible to show the achievability result of entropic security via maximal correlation.
Also note that unlike maximal correlation secrecy where there are tight upper and lower bounds on the optimal key length
s ≈ 2 log(1/ρ) for large n, the lower bounds on the key length given in [4]:
s ≥ n− t
for any entropically secure cipher, and
s ≥ n− t+ log 1

−O(1)
for public-coin schemes, are much smaller than the achievable key length. It is conjectured in [4] that the achievable key length
is tight.
V. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER SECRECY CRITERIA
In this section, we compare maximal correlation secrecy to other secrecy criteria that use the mutual information I(M ;C)
between the message M and the ciphertext C. We show that ρ-maximal correlation secrecy is stronger than these other secrecy
criteria as they are implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy with suitable choices of ρ, but they do not imply ρ-maximal
correlation secrecy for any ρ < 1.
As pointed out by Maurer [16], mutual information is too loose a criterion if it is not required to approach zero because
it does not guarantee hiding any bit (or more generally any function) of the message. For an n bit message and an s-bit key
the mutual information is lower bounded as I(M ;C) ≥ n− s and this bound can be achieved simply by encrypting the most
significant s bits of M perfectly and sending the rest of the bits in the clear. Hence unless s ≥ n, mutual information cannot
7guarantee that any bit of M is not leaked. There are other ciphers that can achieve the same minimum mutual information
but ensure better secrecy. For example, suppose we wish to encrypt a 2-bit message M ∼ Unif({0, 1, 2, 3}) using a 1-bit key
K ∼ Bern(1/2). Let C1 = M + 2K mod 4 be the cipher which encrypts only the most significant bit of the message and
C2 = M + K mod 4 be another cipher that achieves I(M ;C) = 1. It is easy to see that using C2, Eve cannot correctly
guess any bit of the message with probability greater than 3/4 signifying that C2 provides better secrecy than C1. Moreover
the second cipher achieves lower maximal correlation ρm(M ;C2) =
√
2/2 than the first ρm(M ;C1) = 1, hence maximal
correlation is a better measure of secrecy than mutual information.
We now formalize the relationship between maximal correlation secrecy and the mutual information secrecy measures of
strong secrecy [16], weak secrecy [14], and leakage rate [27]. By the following proposition which follows from Theorem 5 in
[34], a ρ-maximal correlation secrecy guarantees a small mutual information.
Proposition 1. Let X and Y be two discrete random variables, then
I(X;Y ) ≤ log ((min {|X | , |Y|} − 1) · ρ2m(X;Y ) + 1) . (3)
In the following we assume that M ∼ Unif([1 : 2n]), which reduces (3) to
I(M ;C) ≤ log ((2n − 1)ρ2m(M ;C) + 1) . (4)
We now use the above proposition to compare ρ-maximal correlation secrecy to secrecy criteria that use the mutual information.
Strong secrecy. This criterion requires that limn→∞ I(M ;C) = 0. From (4) this is implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy
for
ρ = o(2−n/2).
Weak secrecy. This criterion requires that limn→∞ I(M ;C)/n = 0. From (4), this is implied by ρ-maximal correlation secrecy
for
ρ = 2−n/2+o(n).
Leakage rate. Note that both weak and strong secrecy require the key rate limn s/n = 1. By requiring that limn I(M ;C)/n ≤
RL for some leakage rate RL, a key rate of 1 − RL can be achieved. From (4), this is implied by ρ-maximal correlation
secrecy for
ρ = 2−(1−RL)n/2+o(n).
Note that Theorem 5 implies that such ρ can be achieved also by a key rate of 1 − RL. Hence maximal correlation secrecy
provides a better security guarantee than leakage rate with no penalty on the key rate.
The above results show that ρ-maximal correlation secret implies secrecy criteria involving mutual information. We now
show that a small I(M ;C) does not necessarily imply ρ-maximal correlation secrecy. Consider the following cipher: Let
M = C = K = [0 : 2n − 1], and the encryption and decryption functions be
E(k,m) =
{
m+ k mod 2n − 1 if m < 2n − 1
2n − 1 if m = 2n − 1,
and D(k, c) = E(−k, c). Direct computation yields I(M ;C) = 2−n(n + 2 − 2−(n−1)), which goes to zero as n tends to
infinity, and thus the cipher satisfies strong secrecy. However, since one can determine if M = 2n − 1 or not by observing
C, ρm(M ;C) = 1. Hence ρ-maximal correlation secrecy is a strictly stronger secrecy criterion than criteria that use mutual
information.
VI. PROOF OF THE RESULTS
A. Properties of Maximal Correlation
We use a characterization of maximal correlation in terms of the spectral norm that follows directly from the singular value
characterization of maximal correlation in [8].
Lemma 1. Let (X,Y ) ∼ p(x, y) be discrete random variables with marginals p(x) and p(y). Define the matrix B ∈ R|X |×|Y|
with entries
Bxy =
p(x, y)√
p(x)p(y)
−
√
p(x)p(y).
8Then,
ρm(X;Y ) = ‖B‖.
Next we state a result relating maximal correlation and the χ2-divergence between the joint pmf and the product of the
marginal pmfs, also known as χ2 measure of correlation which follows directly from [9].
Lemma 2. Let (X,Y ) ∼ p(x, y) be discrete random variables with marginals p(x) and p(y). Then,
1
min {|X | , |Y|} − 1 ≤
ρ2m(X;Y )
χ2 (p(x, y) ‖ p(x)p(y)) ≤ 1,
where
χ2(p(x)‖q(x)) =
∑
m
(p(x))
2
q(x)
− 1
is the χ2-divergence between p(x) and q(x).
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We prove Theorem 1, which shows that maximal correlation secrecy implies Rényi entropy constrained security. First prove
the case for general functions f(m). Note that it is implied by the following more general result.
Proposition 2. Consider any two pmfs pM (m) and pˆM (m) onM, and a Markov kernel pC|M (c|m). The two pmfs induce the
joint probability measures P and Pˆ on (M,C), respectively. Let ρm(M ;C) be the maximal correlation in P. For any functions
f :M→ N and f˜ : C → N, we have∣∣∣Pˆ{f(M) = f˜(C)}−∑
i
Pˆ {f(M) = i} · P{f˜(C) = i}
∣∣∣ ≤ ρm(M ;C)√χ2 (pˆM‖pM ) + 1.
Proof: All expectations, variances and covariances in this proof are in P. Assume the range of f(m) is {1, ..., l}.
Let Z1, ..., Zl be i.i.d. Rademacher random variables. Let g(m) = Zf(m)pˆM (m)/pM (m) and g˜(c) = Zf˜(c). Write χ
2 =
χ2 (pˆM‖pM ), pˆf (i) = Pˆ {f(M) = i}, pf˜ (i) = P{f˜(C) = i} and pˆeq = Pˆ{f(M) = f˜(C)}. Observe that
E(g(M) | Zl1) =
∑
i
pˆf (i)Zi,
E(g˜(C) | Zl1) =
∑
i
pf˜ (i)Zi,
E
(
(g(M))2 | Zl1
)
=
∑
m
pM (m)
(
Zf(m)pˆM (m)
pM (m)
)2
= χ2 + 1,
E
(
Cov
(
g(M), g˜(C) | Zl1
))
= E
(
E
(
g(M)g˜(C) | Zl1
)− E(g(M) | Zl1)E(g˜(C) | Zl1))
= E
(∑
m
p(m)g(m)
∑
c
p(c|m)g˜(c)− (∑
i
pˆf (i)Zi
)(∑
i
pf˜ (i)Zi
))
= E
(∑
m
pˆM (m)
∑
c
p(c|m)Zf˜(c)Zf(m) −
(∑
i
pˆf (i)Zi
)(∑
i
pf˜ (i)Zi
))
= pˆeq −
∑
i
pˆf (i)pf˜ (i).
E
(∣∣Cov(g(M), g˜(C) | Zl1)∣∣) ≥ ∣∣E (Cov(g(M), g˜(C) | Zl1))∣∣
=
∣∣∣pˆeq −∑
i
pˆf (i)pf˜ (i)
∣∣∣.
Hence there exists constant zl1 such that∣∣Cov(g(M), g˜(C) | Zl1 = zl1)∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣pˆeq −∑
i
pˆf (i)pf˜ (i)
∣∣∣.
9We have
ρm(M ;C) ≥
∣∣Cov(g(M), g˜(C) |Zl1 = zl1)∣∣√
Var(g(M) |Zl1 = zl1)Var(g˜(C) |Zl1 = zl1)
≥
∣∣Cov(g(M), g˜(C) |Zl1 = zl1)∣∣√
E((g(M))2 |Zl1 = zl1)E((g˜(C))2 |Zl1 = zl1)
≥
∣∣pˆeq −∑i pˆf (i)pf˜ (i)∣∣√
χ2 + 1
.
The result follows.
To obtain Theorem 1, take P to be the uniform distribution on M and Pˆ to be the actual distribution. The result follows
from
∑
i Pˆ {f(M) = i} · P{f˜(C) = i} ≤ maxi Pˆ {f(M) = i} and
χ2 (pM‖Unif[1 : 2n]) = 2n−H2(M) − 1.
To show the result in Remark 1, take F˜ to be a random variable in the probability space Pˆ independent of M with
Pˆ{F˜ = i} = P{f˜(C) = i}, then the result follows from
Pˆ{f(M) = F˜} =
∑
i
Pˆ {f(M) = i} · P{f˜(C) = i}.
Then we prove a slightly better result for one-bit functions f(m). Note that it is implied by the following more general
result.
Proposition 3. Consider any two pmfs pM (m) and pˆM (m) onM, and a Markov kernel pC|M (c|m). The two pmfs induce the
joint probability measures P and Pˆ on (M,C), respectively. Let ρm(M ;C) be the maximal correlation in P. For any one-bit
functions f :M→ {0, 1} and f˜ : C → {0, 1}, we have
Pˆ
{
f(M) = f˜(C)
}
− 1
2
≤
√
1
4
ρ2m(M ;C) (χ
2 (pˆM‖pM ) + 1) + (1− ρ2m(M ;C))
(
Pˆ {f(M) = 0} − 1
2
)2
.
Proof: All expectations, variances and covariances in this proof are in P. Let g(m) = (−1)f(m) pˆM (m)/pM (m) and
g˜(c) = (−1)f˜(c). Write χ2 = χ2 (pˆM‖pM ), pˆf (i) = Pˆ {f(M) = i}, pf˜ (i) = P{f˜(C) = i} and pˆe = Pˆ{f(M) 6= f˜(C)}. It
is straightforward to check that Proposition 3 is true if pˆe ≥ min{pˆf (0), pˆf (1)}. Hence we assume pˆe < min{pˆf (0), pˆf (1)}.
Observe that
E(g(M)) = pˆf (0)− pˆf (1),
E(g˜(C)) = pf˜ (0)− pf˜ (1),
Var(g(M)) =
∑
m
(pˆM (m))
2
pM (m)
− (pˆf (0)− pˆf (1))2
= (χ2 + 1)− (pˆf (0)− pˆf (1))2 ,
Var(g˜(C)) = 1−
(
pf˜ (0)− pf˜ (1)
)2
,
Cov
(
g(M), g˜(C)
)
= E
(
g(M)g˜(C)
)− E(g(M))E(g˜(C))
=
∑
m
p(m)g(m)
∑
c
p(c|m)g˜(c)− (pˆf (0)− pˆf (1))(pf˜ (0)− pf˜ (1))
= 1− 2pˆe − (pˆf (0)− pˆf (1))
(
pf˜ (0)− pf˜ (1)
)
.
We have
ρ2m(M ;C) ≥
(
Cov
(
g(M), g˜(C)
))2
Var
(
g(M)
)
Var
(
g˜(C)
)
=
(
1− 2pˆe −
(
pˆf (0)− pˆf (1)
)(
pf˜ (0)− pf˜ (1)
))2
(
(χ2 + 1)− (pˆf (0)− pˆf (1))2
)(
1−
(
pf˜ (0)− pf˜ (1)
)2)
≥ (1− 2pˆe)
2 − (1− 2pˆf (0))2
(χ2 + 1)− (1− 2pˆf (0))2
,
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where the last inequality is due to pˆe < min{pˆf (0), pˆf (1)} and
(a− bx)2
1− x2 =
(
a√
1− x2 −
bx√
1− x2
)2
≥ a2 − b2
for any a, b such that |a| > |b| and −1 < x < 1. Hence,
(1− 2pˆe)2 ≤ ρ2m(M ;C)
(
(χ2 + 1)− (1− 2pˆf (0))2
)
+ (1− 2pˆf (0))2
= ρ2m(M ;C)(χ
2 + 1) +
(
1− ρ2m(M ;C)
)
(1− 2pˆf (0))2 .
The result follows.
To prove Theorem 1 for one-bit functions f(m), note that by Proposition 3,
Pˆ
{
f(M) = f˜(C)
}
− 1
2
≤
√
1
4
ρ2m(M ;C) (χ
2 (pˆM‖pM ) + 1) + (1− ρ2m(M ;C))
(
Pˆ {f(M) = 0} − 1
2
)2
≤
√
1
4
ρ2m(M ;C) (χ
2 (pˆM‖pM ) + 1) +
(
Pˆ {f(M) = 0} − 1
2
)2
≤
√
1
4
ρ2m(M ;C) (χ
2 (pˆM‖pM ) + 1) +
√(
Pˆ {f(M) = 0} − 1
2
)2
=
1
2
ρm(M ;C)
√
χ2 (pˆM‖pM ) + 1 +max
{
Pˆ {f(M) = 0} , Pˆ {f(M) = 1}
}
− 1
2
.
This completes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Here we assume the ciphertext length is arbitrary, and the encryption function can be randomized, i.e., the ciphertext is
C = E(K,M,W ) where W ∼ p(w) is the local randomness at the sender. We require that D(k,E(k,m,w)) = m for any
k,m,w. From Lemma 2,
ρ2 ≥ ρ2m(M ;C)
≥ 2−nχ2 (p(m, c) ‖ p(m)p(c))
= 2−n
(∑
m,c
(p(m, c))
2
p(m)p(c)
− 1
)
=
∑
m,c
(p(m, c))
2
p(c)
− 2−n
=
∑
c
∑
m (p(m, c))
2
p(c)
− 2−n
≥
∑
c
|{m : p(m, c) > 0}|−1 (∑m p(m, c))2
p(c)
− 2−n
= E
(
|{m : p(m,C) > 0}|−1
)
− 2−n
≥ E
(
|{D(k,C) : k ∈ [1 : 2s]}|−1
)
− 2−n
≥ 2−s − 2−n.
Hence,
s ≥ log
(
1
ρ2 + 2−n
)
= 2 log
1
ρ
− log
(
1 +
1
2nρ2
)
.
This completes the proof.
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D. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 is a direct consequence of Lemma 1. Since M,C ∼ Unif[1 : 2n], we have
ρm(M ;C) = 2
n
∥∥PMC − 2−2n12n×2n∥∥
= 2n
∥∥∥∥ 1d · 2nA− 2−2n12n×2n
∥∥∥∥
=
1
d
∥∥∥∥A− d2n12n×2n
∥∥∥∥
=
1
d
|λ2(A)|.
Ramanujan graphs have second eigenvalue |λ2(A)| ≤ 2
√
d− 1, hence their maximal correlation is
ρm(M ;C) ≤ 2
√
d− 1
d
≤ 2√
d
.
As a result, if log d ≥ 2 log(1/ρ) + 2, we have ρm(M ;C) ≤ ρ.
E. Proofs of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1
We first prove a lemma on the cascade of two ciphers with the same message length n but with possibly different key
lengths s1 and s2, which yields a cipher with message length n and key length s1 + s2.
Lemma 3. Let (E1, D1) and (E2, D2) be two ciphers with key lengths s1 and s2, respectively, and the same message length
n. Define the cascade of these two ciphers to be the cipher K = [1 : 2s1 ]× [1 : 2s2 ], M = C = [1 : 2n],
E(k1, k2,m) = E2 (k2, E1(k1,m)) , D(k1, k2,m) = D1 (k1, D2(k2,m)) .
Then we have
ρm (M ; E(K1,K2,M)) ≤ ρm (M ; E1(K1,M)) · ρm (M ; E2(K2,M)) .
Proof: Consider the following alternate characterization of maximal correlation in [7]
ρm (X; Y ) = max
f(x):E(f(X))=0,E(f2(X))=1
√
E
(
(E (f(X) | Y ))2
)
.
Let M1 ∼ Unif[1 : 2n], M2 = E1(K1,M1), C = E2 (K2,M2). Note that for any f, g : [1 : 2n] → R with E(f(M1)) =
E(g(C)) = 0, E(f2(M1)) = E(g2(C)) = 1, by the alternate characterization,
E (f(M1)g(C)) = E (E (f(M1) |M2) · E (g(C) |M2))
≤
√
E
(
(E (f(M1) |M2))2
)
· E
(
(E (g(C) |M2))2
)
≤ ρm (M1;M2) · ρm (C;M2) .
The result follows.
Now consider the following result from [33]. Let A1, . . . , Ad ∈ RN×N be i.i.d. random permutation matrices uniformly
distributed in the set of permutations of {1, . . . , N}. Then we have
E
(∣∣∣∣∣λ2
(
d∑
i=1
(
Ai +A
T
i
))∣∣∣∣∣
)
≤ 2√2d− 1
(
1 +
ln d√
2d
+O
(
d−1/2
))
+O
(
d3/2 ln lnN
lnN
)
. (5)
We use the above result to construct a cipher as follows. Generate d = 2s−1 permutations on [1 : 2n], namely σ1, . . . , σd,
i.i.d. uniformly at random. Let σi+d = σ−1i for i = 1, . . . , d. The cipher is defined as K = [1 : 2s], M = C = [1 : 2n],
E(k,m) = σk(m), D(k, c) = σ−1k (c). By Lemma 1,
ρm(M ;C) =
∥∥∥∥2nPMC − 12n12n×2n
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥ 12d
d∑
i=1
(
Ai +A
T
i
)− 1
2n
12n×2n
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
2d
∣∣∣∣∣λ2
(
d∑
i=1
(
Ai +A
T
i
))∣∣∣∣∣ .
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Hence by (5), there exist fixed σ1, . . . , σd and a constant η > 0 (that does not depend on s or n) such that
ρm(M ;C) ≤ 1
2d
(
2
√
2d− 1
(
1 +
ln d√
2d
+ ηd−1/2
)
+ η · d
3/2 log n
n
)
≤ 2√
2d
(
1 +
ln d√
2d
+ η
(
d−1/2 +
d log n
n
))
≤ 4√
2d
= 2−s/2+2 (6)
if d ≥ 16η2 and n/ log n ≥ 4ηd, or equivalently,
2 log η + 5 ≤ s ≤ log n− log log n− log η − 1. (7)
Note that this construction only works for very short key lengths. We now provide a construction for general key length s by
the cascade of several ciphers with short key lengths. Let
t =
⌈
s
log n− log log n− log η − 2
⌉
, s˜ =
⌊s
t
⌋
, a = t
(⌊s
t
⌋
+ 1
)
− s, b = s− t
⌊s
t
⌋
,
then we have a + b = t and s = as˜ + b(s˜ + 1). Consider the cascade of a ciphers with key length s˜ and b ciphers of key
length s˜+ 1, which gives a cipher with key length s. Let s0 be an integer satisfying
s0 ≥ max{4 log η + 12 , 220}
and
log s0 − log log s0 ≥ 5 log η + 14.
Consider any s ≥ s0. If n ≤ s, then perfect secrecy can be achieved. Hence we assume n > s ≥ s0. To check the conditions
in (7) for s˜ and s˜+ 1,
s˜ =
⌊
s⌈
s (log n− log log n− log η − 2)−1
⌉⌋
≥ s
s (log n− log log n− log η − 2)−1 + 1 − 1
=
1
(log n− log log n− log η − 2)−1 + s−1 − 1
≥ 1
(4 log η + 12)
−1
+ (4 log η + 12)
−1 − 1
= 2 log η + 5.
And also
s˜+ 1 =
⌊
s⌈
s (log n− log log n− log η − 2)−1
⌉⌋+ 1
≤ log n− log log n− log η − 1.
Hence by (6) and Lemma 3, the maximal correlation of the resultant cipher is
ρm(M ;C) ≤
(
2−s˜/2+2
)a (
2−(s˜+1)/2+2
)b
= 2−s/2+2t,
where
2t = 2
⌈
s
log n− log log n− log η − 2
⌉
≤ 2s
log n− log log n− log η − 2 + 2
≤ 2s
log n− log log n− (log n− log logn) /5 + 2
=
5s/2
log n− log log n + 2
13
≤ 4s
log n
+ 2,
where the last inequality is due to log n ≥ log s0 ≥ 14. Therefore,
2 log
1
ρm(M ;C)
≥ s
(
1− 8
log n
)
− 4.
Rearranging, we have
s ≤
(
2 log
1
ρm(M ;C)
+ 4
)(
1− 8
log n
)−1
≤
(
2 log
1
ρm(M ;C)
)(
1 +
16
log n
)
+ 16.
Hence if
s ≥
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
α
log n
)
+ α.
where α = max{16, s0}, then s ≥ s0, and ρm(M ;C) ≤ ρ. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Now we prove Corollary 1. If
s ≥
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
3α/2
log(log(1/ρ) + 1)
)
,
then
log
1
ρ
+ 1 ≤ s
2
(
1 +
3α/2
log(log(1/ρ) + 1)
)−1
+ 1
≤ s
2
+ 1
≤ s
due to the assumption that s ≥ 2. Hence,
s ≥
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
3α/2
log(log(1/ρ) + 1)
)
=
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
α
log(log(1/ρ) + 1)
)
+
α log(1/ρ)
log(log(1/ρ) + 1)
≥
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
α
log(log(1/ρ) + 1)
)
+ α
≥
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
α
log s
)
+ α
≥
(
2 log
1
ρ
)(
1 +
α
log n
)
+ α,
where the last step is due to the assumption that n > s. This complete the proof of Corollary 1.
F. Proof of Theorem 5
We first compute the maximal correlation of a binary additive stream cipher. The following proposition follows by Fourier
analysis of Boolean functions [35]; see [12].
Proposition 4. A binary additive stream cipher has a maximal correlation
ρm(M ;C) = max
v∈{0,1}n\0n
∣∣∣∣∣ 1|K|∑
k∈K
(−1)
∑n−1
l=0 vlGl(k)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
We now proceed to prove Theorem 5. Assume we generate Gi(k) i.i.d. Bern(1/2) across k and i. For each fixed v 6= 0n,
consider
1
|K|
∑
k∈K
(−1)
∑n−1
l=0 vlGl(k) .
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The terms (−1)
∑n−1
l=0 vlGl(k) are i.i.d. Rademacher. By the Chernoff bound,
P
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1|K|∑
k∈K
(−1)
∑n−1
l=0 vlGl(k)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ ρ
}
≤ 21−|K|·DKL( 1+ρ2 ‖ 12 ).
By the union bound on all possible v ∈ {0, 1}n\0n and observing that (ln 2)DKL
(
1+ρ
2
∥∥ 1
2
)
> ρ2/2 for ρ > 0,
P {ρm(M ; C) ≥ ρ} ≤ 2(n+1)−|K|·DKL(
1+ρ
2 ‖ 12 )
< 2(n+1)−|K|ρ
2/(2 ln 2).
Hence if
s ≥ 2 log 1
ρ
+ log n+ log
(
1 +
1
n
log
1

)
+ 2,
then
2s ≥ 4ρ−2n
(
1 +
1
n
log
1

)
≥ 4 (ln 2) ρ−2
(
n+ log
1

)
.
Therefore,
P {ρm(M ; C) ≥ ρ} < 2(n+1)−2sρ2/(2 ln 2)
≤ 2(n+1)−2(n−log )
≤ 21−n+log 
≤ .
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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